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ON THE RELATION OF INFORMAL TO FORMAL LOGIC
Dale Jacquette
Department of Philosophy




The distinction between formal and informal logic is clarified as a prelude to considering their ideal
relation. Aristotle's syllogistic describes forms of valid inference, and is in that sense a formal logic.
Yet the square of opposition and rules of middle term distribution of positive or negative
propositions in an argument's premises and conclusion are standardly received as devices of so-
called informal logic and critical reasoning. I propose a more exact criterion for distinguishing
between formal and informal logic, and then defend a model for fruitful interaction between informal
and formal methods of investigating and critically assessing the logic of arguments.
***
1. A Strange Dichotomy
In the history of logic a division between formal and informal methods has emerged. The distinction is not always
sharply drawn, and there are theoretical disagreements with practical implications about the logical techniques
that should be classified as formal or informal, and about the scope and limits and paradigms of each of these
two main categories of logic.
The distinction arises because of unresolved questions about how logical relations are best expressed. At its
furthest extremes, the distinction manifests itself as a difference of ideology and methodology between
practioners of the most highly formalized symbolic mathematical logics and the purely informal treatment of
logical inference in the rhetoric of argumentation, using only the discursive resources of ordinary language.
The polemics associated with disputes between formal and informal logicians are instructive even when they are
not especially worthy of imitation. Formal logicians of a radical stripe often dismiss informal logical techniques as
insufficiently rigorous, precise, or general in scope, while their equally vehement counterparts in the informal logic
camp typically regard algebraic logic and set theoretical semantics as nothing more than an empty formalism
lacking both theoretical significance and practical application when not informed by the informal logical content
that formal logicians pretend to despise.
 
I shall not try to document these attitudes, because they are not the sort of views to appear explicitly in the
writings of proponents on either side. But I think that anyone who has spent much time working in formal or
informal logic, and certainly those who have crossed over from time to time to try their hand at both styles of
logic or associated with outspoken members of each side will know well enough from anecdotal experience
about the professional polarization to which I refer. I do not insist that the antagonism between formal and
informal logicians cannot be friendly and respectful, although I suspect that unfortunately it is often something less.
There is no reason for example why a healthy intellectual rivalry between formal and informal logicians should not
be fostered in order to promote advances on both sides in the sort of free market competition of ideas that can
help logic to flourish. Such is evidently the case with the tolerance among logicians and mathematicians of
differences between classical and intuitionistic and other nonstandard logics, Euclidean and non-Euclidean
geometry, and even more prosaic distinctions of method such as that between axiomatic and natural deduction
methods in symbolic logic. My impression is that the reality at least of the current situation in logic with its deep-
seated bifurcation between formal and informal methods is in this respect far less than ideal. The division is
something more like that described by C. P. Snow in his landmark discussion of The Two Cultures.1
Indeed, the analogy is quite appropriate and may just be a special instance of the general case, with formal
logicians falling on the same side as the exact sciences, and informal logic finding its natural home with the
humanities.
Now I find the division between formal and informal logic to be a rather strange dichotomy. Since I consider
myself to be both a formal and informal logician, I see the formal and informal logical extremes as two
complementary poles along a continuum that insensibly grade off into one another without a definite boundary,
and hence as offering no clearcut basis for partisanship. I agree with the informal logicians' claim that symbolic
logic by itself is an empty formalism that needs to have a content supplied by informal reasoning. But I also agree
with formal logicians when they complain that purely informal logic is often too blunt an instrument to handle
highly sophisticated problems involving exact or universal concepts, and that informal reasoning can sometimes
overlook logical problems and solutions that formal logic is uniquely able to reveal. I am inclined on pragmatic
grounds therefore to accept whatever logical methods are best suited for my analytic purposes in trying to
understand many different kinds of logical problems. I think it is only reasonable not to stand on any exclusionary
principle in confronting the logic of arguments, but to adopt a style of doing logic that appears to work best in
offering the most satisfying results in formulating ideas and testing inferences, in the expression and critical
analysis of concepts and arguments, and generally speaking as a guide to good thinking.
 
I assume that just as there are adversaries who gravitate toward one side of the formal-informal logic distinction
in dialectical opposition to the other, so there must also be many others like myself who will prefer a sensible
principled compromise between these two extremes, who hope that formal and informal logic can work together
in a productive partnership. It is to give substance to this promise of integrating formal and informal logic that I
propose first to give a more exact criterion of the distinction between formal and informal logic, and then to
defend a model for the fruitful interaction between formal and informal logical methods.
 
2. Toward a Definition of Formal and Informal Logic
If the attempt to find middle ground between exclusionary formal and informal logic programs is to succeed, then
the first task is to clarify the concepts of formal and informal logic. Then it may be possible to describe a way of
reconciling formal and informal logical techniques in a more comprehensive though not necessarily syncretic
philosophy of logic.
The concepts of formal and informal logic are best approached by beginning with some faulty attempts at
definition, and trying to understand exactly how and why they go wrong. We have already observed that
Aristotle's logic of syllogisms with its rules for valid inferences and square of opposition is a kind of formal logic,
even though it is usually classified as a branch of informal logic.
The same must then be true of Beardsley argument diagramming and Venn, Euler, and Lewis Carroll
diagramming. These methods of representing the structure and assessing the deductive validity especially of
syllogistic arguments involving Boolean relations as set theoretical inclusions or exclusions of entities in the
extensions of predicates intuitively concern the formal logical properties of propositions and arguments. The use
of schematic variables, mathematically regimented syntax, and graphic or set theoretical semantic techniques
moreover are not necessary to distinguish formal from informal logics. A formal logic in one sense can always be
presented in ordinary albeit stinted English. The difference between formulating in symbolic logic an expression
such as ($x)(F = l y [ž (y = x)]) and articulating in nonsymbolic formal terms the equivalent proposition that
'There is an entity such that a certain property is identical to the abstract property of being necessarily identical to
the entity'. In the English paraphrase there is no 'formalism' or symbolic notation as usually understood; yet the
phrase as much describes formal relations as does the more straightforwardly 'formal' symbolism containing the
existential quantifier, lambda operator, modal necessity operator, parentheses and brackets. All such elements
are legitimately part of formal logic insofar as they involve logical forms of relations and logical forms of
arguments, regardless of whether they are written in a special symbolic notation or in modified English.
 
It is tempting in light of these conclusions to consider eliminating the distinction between formal and informal logic
altogether. This is an attractive option if we interpret all of logic as involving the forms and structures of syntax,
semantic relations, and argumentative patterns. Then, while the term 'logical form' designates a special kind of
form, the phrase 'formal logic' is technically redundant. It may then be preferable to substitute the terminology of
symbolic-nonsymbolic logic for the formal-informal logic distinction. The disadvantage of the approach is that the
distinction between formal and informal logic is well-entrenched in logicians' parlance. As a result, we do less
violence to established usage if in good linguistic conscience we can maintain the formal-informal logic vocabulary
by providing acceptable definitions of 'formal' and 'informal' logic. The problem is that I am not at all sure that
there can be a satisfactory definition of the distinction between formal and informal logic that is both intuitively
correct and fully in agreement with current terminological usage. The reason, I believe, is that established
linguistic practice among logicians is itself not entirely intuitively correct. I shall therefore try to negotiate a
commonsense compromise that distinguishes between formal and informal logic in a way that does not exactly
conform to the standard convention, but that I think many and perhaps even most logicians on both sides of the
distinction may find acceptable.
My suggestion is to distinguish between formal and informal logic by applying the arguably less controversial
because criteriologically better-defined distinction between specialized symbolic versus nonspecialized
nonsymbolic logic. More specifically, I propose that a logical theory or procedure is formal if and only if it adopts
a specialized symbolism for representing logical forms that does not occur in ordinary nonspecialized
nonsymbolic thought and language. Although I acknowledge that all of logic has to do with logical form, I do not
believe that all expressions of logical form must themselves be formal. This distinction captures much of the
received concept, since it includes all of symbolic logic and excludes nonsymbolic evaluations of validity or
invalidity. As we might expect, formal logic by the proposed distinction will roughly include everything belonging
to what has become the de facto criterion for formal logic in relations expressed by means of standard and
nonstandard notational variations and extensions of the propositional and predicate-quantificational calculus. But
the definition also includes schematic and graphic treatments of syllogistic logic that have traditionally been
regarded as more properly within the aegis of informal logic and critical reasoning. Informal logic by contrast on
the present proposal is limited to the consideration of a proposition's or argument's logical form by discursive
reconstruction within natural language, the use of counterexamples to discredit inferences, identification of
arguments as committing any of the so-called rhetorical fallacies, and the like.
The relegation of syllogistic logic, square of opposition, and argument diagramming methods to the genus of
informal logic can now be seen as a kind of historical accident. Were it not for the emergence of more powerful
algebraic methods of formal logic with the discovery of formal logical techniques in Frege's Begriffsschrift and
C.S. Peirce's proto-quantificational logic, there is little doubt that the logic of syllogisms, Venn and other styles of
diagramming, etc., would constitute the whole of formal logic as opposed to purely informal nonspecialized
nonsymbolic logical methods, beyond which Kant in the late eighteenth century was able to declare that no
significant advances had been made since the time of Aristotle.2 Why then should such logical techniques be
displaced as informal given the development of contemporary algebraic methods of mathematical logic?
I think it is more appropriate to classify syllogisms and the tools of logic that have standardly been turned over to
the informal logic and critical reasoning textbooks as less powerful, general, and technically advanced, but every
bit as formal as rigorously symbolic mathematical logics. As a consequence, I include Aristotelian syllogistic and
all related graphic paraphernalia as part of genuinely formal logic. I am therefore committed to saying that these
methods are properly part of formal logic despite their usually being included in what are called informal logic
texts as adjuncts to what is called the informal logic curriculum. If this is true, then it may be time for logicians to
admit that insofar as they use syllogistic logic and argument diagramming they are doing formal logic under the
mistaken rubric of informal logic, and that it is equally time for formal logicians to admit that there are weaker less
universal methods of logic that are just as formal as the algebraic methods of formal symbolic logic which they
may prefer to use, but which do not for that reason alone have exclusive title to the category of formal logic.
What then is to be said about the English translation of ($x)(F = l y [ž (y = x)])? The natural language
equivalents of any such expression are strictly informal by my criterion. Yet I imagine that ordinary language
translations of expressions in symbolic logic are unlikely to find application in practice as a workable replacement
for formal logic methods. The reason quite obviously is that the ordinary language equivalents while available in
principle are simply too cumbersome, as they would be in the parallel case of trying to develop an informal
mathematics for the purpose of formulating and solving quadratic polynomial equations. With regard to another
problem of the practical implications of the distinction, I want to explain that I have no definite pedagogical
recommendations to make with respect to the division of logical methods according to the traditional distinction
between formal and informal logic. Thus, I see nothing wrong with continuing to teach syllogistic logic and Venn
diagramming, to mention two conspicuous examples, as part of nonmathematical logic, critical reasoning, or what
is popularly called informal logic. It is just that by my characterization of the distinction between formal and
informal logic I find it misleading to refer to such techniques as informal.
I do not claim that my definition of formal and informal logic could not be improved. I have already indicated that
I regard the proposal as a tradeoff between conflicting jointly unsatisfiable desiderata. But for present purposes I
want to investigate the implications of distinguishing between formal and purely informal logic alternatively as the
analysis of logical form by means of specialized symbolisms versus the study of logical form by means of ordinary
language.
 3. Formal and Informal Logic in Partnership
There are many ways in which formal and informal logic interact. There are many situations in which formal and
informal logic may need to cooperate in order to critically evaluate arguments.
Formal symbolic logics are always accompanied by and presented within a discursive framework of informal
metalanguage introductions and explanations, or can be traced back through a genealogy of formal conventions
to an informal context. Without grounding in ordinary language and a relation to informal ideas, even the
formalisms most familiar to practicing logicians lack meaning and application. If symbolic logic is not always
needed, if it can be an impediment to understanding, and if it cannot function effectively entirely on its own for
theoretical purposes in the explication of logical connections and deductive proof of consequences, then
formalisms must be justified by a philosophical rationale. Informal logic is also useful and typically essential in
working through a preliminary heuristic analysis of a problem before it can be decided whethere and if so what
kind of formal logic to apply in modeling a selection of logical relations or solving a logical problem. Sometimes
informal methods provide a better, easier, or more understandable conceptual analysis of the logic of a
proposition or argument.
Accordingly, I want to propose a pragmatic principle that allows informal and formal logical methods to be used
individually or in combination to achieve the best analysis of the logic of arguments as determined by the specific
requirements of each situation. The ideal is for logicians to cultivate proficiency in as many formal and informal
logical methods as may be available, not excluding efforts to discover or invent new techniques as each task may
demand or that may best answer the exigencies of each analytic problem considered independently on its own
terms as a challenge for logical investigation in its own right. I shall illustrate the potential gains from the
partnership between formal and informal logic that I visualize by two examples. The first example demonstrates
the importance of informal reasoning as a preparation for formalization in the informal analysis of logical
problems. The preliminary informal consideration of a logical paradox when properly done can sometimes avoid
the need for formalization altogether, while in other cases it may demarcate the extent to which a minimal partial
formalization may be useful, or provide a set of parameters by which the crucial concepts and relations to be
formalized can first be identified and an exact purpose and justification for formalization determined. The problem
I have chosen is the Epimenides or liar paradox, a famous logical puzzle with interesting implications for our
understanding of the nature of truth, the limits of sentence meaning in a language, and the semantics of reference,
for which many different elaborate formal logical solutions have otherwise been proposed.
The Liar Paradox
The liar paradox is the implicit logical inconsistency entailed by a sentence that asserts its own falsehood. There
are several different formulations of liar sentences, which for convenience can be represented by a simplified
expression of self-denial in the standard example:
(L) This sentence is false.
Assuming a classical bivalent truth value semantics, the liar paradox is supposed to follow by dilemma from the
constructibility of L. This is the orthodox informal explanation of the liar paradox dilemma. Suppose L is true.
Since L says of itself that it is false, then, if L is true, it is false. Now suppose that L is false. Then, again because
of L's self-denial, it is not the case that L is false, from which it follows that L is true. The conclusion seems
inescapable that liar sentence L is true if and only if it is false.3 The contradiction is obviously intolerable. There
are two main categories of responses to the liar paradox within standard logic. The force of the liar paradox is
often understood to exert pressure on the concept of truth and the bivalent truth value semantics in which the
paradox arises. Alternatively, the truth-valuability or meaningfulness of the liar sentence or its constructibility in an
ideal language is challenged.
Many solutions have been proposed. Historically, these have included introducing nonstandard many-valued or
truth-value gap logics to replace the ordinary two-valued structure, and legislating against self-reference, self-
(non)-application, indexicals, demonstratives, or truth value predications within a language. The former strategy
has been shown by Brian Skyrms in "Return of the Liar: Three-Valued Logic and the Concept of Truth" to be
ineffective by itself against strengthened liar paradoxes that can be constructed for any enlargement of truth-value
semantics. The idea is to define a new truth function that collapses n £ 2 truth values into two, by mapping onto
falsehood whatever truth value negation receives in the n-valued system.4 The latter strategy is at the heart of
Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, in which formal languages are stratified into object- and metalanguages,
and truth value predications are forbidden within any given language. Truth value predications can then only be
made about a lower-level in a higher-level metalanguage in an indefinitely ascending hierarchy in which it is
possible to make meaningful pronouncements only about the semantic properties of lower-level languages.5 Saul
A. Kripke's "Outline of a Theory of Truth" combines both truth-value gaps and a modified Tarskian stratification
of object-and metalanguages, in which there are transfinitely ramified occurrences of metalanguages within each
level of the original Tarskian hierarchy. Kripke diagnoses the logical ailment of the liar sentence as a failure of
'grounding', since the sentence seems indefinitely to flip-flop between truth and falsehood without reaching any
settled semantic value.6
What is common to what I shall call the orthodox response to the liar sentence is the assumption that the mere
constructibility of the liar sentence is sufficient to entail the liar paradox, that the liar sentence is true if and only if
it is false. The inferability as opposed to the mere constructibility of the liar sentence would be quite another thing.
But no one has attempted to prove that the liar sentence can be deduced from an otherwise logically sound set of
sentences, such as a scientific or philosophical theory, within a language. The attitude is typically that, unless
appropriate precautions are taken, the liar sentence can be formulated, so that we must either prevent its
construction or ameliorate its disastrous effects. The liar sentence exists or can be uttered, so we had better do
something about it. It is precisely this otherwise reasonable traditional assumption that I want to question.7
If the mere constructibility of the liar sentence in a language entails the liar paradox, then the following dilemma





Within the standard semantic framework in which the liar paradox and its solutions are considered, the inference
presumably involves a legitimate relation of a sentence with another self-contradictory sentence. If the liar
sentence L is constructible, then a sentence of the form S & ~S, such as 'L is true and it is not the case that L is
true' (that is, where S = L), is thought paradoxically to be logically forthcoming in the dilemma by excluded
middle from the disjunctive tautology L Ú  ~L, given the self-truth-denying content of L.







True if and only if False
True and False
 
We now need to ask whether the dilemma inference D is itself logically valid or invalid. There is a dilemma that
proves a semantic metaparadox about the liar paradox from the same assumption of a classical semantic
background that D is either valid or invalid. Let us consider the possibilities in opposite order. Suppose that D is
deductively invalid. Then the liar paradox is not entailed by the mere constructibility or truth or falsehood of the
liar sentence L. For in that case the liar sentence whether true or false by hypothesis does not logically imply an
explicit syntactical contradiction of the form S & ~S for any sentence S. If there is to be a liar paradox
engendered by the constructibility of the liar sentence L, then dilemma inference D must on the contrary be
deductively valid. But if D is valid, then, since the conclusion of the inference S & ~S is standardly false, and,
indeed, logically necessarily false, it follows that the liar sentence dilemma based on the disjunction L Ú  ~L itself
must be logically necessarily false. This is a rather extraordinary, but, I think, unavoidable conclusion, which to
my knowledge has nowhere been acknowledged in the extensive philosophical literature on the liar. Now, if the
liar sentence dilemma or excluded middle involving the liar sentence cannot be true in order to entail the liar
paradox, then there simply is no liar paradox even on the assumption that the liar sentence L is true, since the liar
sentence entails the liar paradox by dilemma inference D only if the liar sentence is both true and false, or such
that it is true if and only if it is false. We might not be satisfied to have the liar sentence turn out to be necessarily
false in this way, but our discomfort cannot be understood as a result of the entailment of a logical paradox from
the mere constructibility of the liar sentence.









We are not yet out of the woods. The liar semantic metaparadox I have described is not offered as in any sense
a 'solution' to the liar paradox. We cannot conclude on the basis of the metaparadox that the liar sentence is
simply logically necessarily false. For without special provision, that seems to just put us back on the standardly
semantically problematic false ® true, true ® false loop. If a sentence expressing its own falsehood is false or
even and especially if it is logically necessarily false, then, apparently, it is true. This is no progress over the usual
presentation of the liar paradox. The point I have tried to establish is not that the liar sentence is false, but rather
that the liar paradox is not standardly entailed by the mere constructibility of the liar sentence. Yet if the liar
paradox is not entailed by the mere constructibility as opposed to the inferability of the liar paradox, then the
mere constructibility of the liar paradox poses no threat to classical bivalent truth value or validity semantics, nor
to the naive folk theory of truth. Hence, the mere constructibility of the liar sentence in a language provides no
adequate philosophical motivation for the elaboration of a special formal semantic policy or revision of the naive
theory, such as that represented by a semantics of truth value gaps or Tarskian hierarchy of object- and
metalanguage truth value predications, or Kripkean hybrid of these proposals.
There is a semantic confusion that remains to be untangled. We must recall the over-arching assumption in which
the necessary falsehood of the liar sentence is considered. It has not been suggested that the liar sentence L is
false simpliciter, but only that the liar is standardly logically necessarily false if or on the assumption that
dilemma inference D is standardly logically valid. If L is true if and only if it is false if or on the assumption that
dilemma inference D is standardly logically valid, then there is only one possible conclusion, which is that dilemma
inference D is standardly logically invalid. We can, and as a matter of fact, we must proceed in this way. But if
we do, then we are back in the first liar metaparadox horn, according to which, where dilemma inference D is
logically invalid, the liar paradox once again is not entailed by the mere constructibility of the liar sentence. If
dilemma inference D is logically valid, then liar sentence L is logically necessarily false, from which it seems to
follow that L, which ostensibly says of itself that it is false, is also logically necessarily true. This conclusion again
holds not in any absolute sense, but only conditionally on the assumption that dilemma inference D is logically
valid. What follows therefore is rather that dilemma inference D is not logically valid, and that the liar paradox is
not entailed by the mere constructibility of the liar sentence.
The semantic metaparadox about the liar paradox shows that whether the liar dilemma is logically valid or invalid,
the liar paradox is not logically entailed by the mere constructibility of the liar sentence. The dissolution of the liar
paradox via the liar semantic metaparadox shows that the liar paradox cannot be intelligibly formulated as
entailed by the mere constructibility of the liar sentence in languages powerful enough to express truth-self-
denials. The liar metaparadox suggests that something is wrong with the usual description of how the liar sentence
is supposed to entail the liar paradox by way of the liar paradox dilemma-but what? What hidden fallacy
invalidates the liar paradox argument?
An interesting question remains unanswered if we grasp the invalidity horn of the liar metaparadox dilemma. This
is of course the problem of what makes the liar paradox dilemma in D deductively invalid. From an intuitive point
of view, it seems inadequate to say merely that the inference is invalid because the liar sentence dilemma L Ú  ~L
as a tautology of propositional logic is necessarily true, while the conclusion S & ~S as a contradiction or
inconsistency of propositional logic is necessarily false. This naturally makes the paradox dilemma deductively
invalid. But a deeper difficulty challenges our understanding of the content of liar sentence L, and requires of any
dissolution of the liar paradox by semantic metaparadox a reasonable explanation of why in particular it is
deductively invalid in the second liar paradox dilemma horn to make use of either or both of the following
inferences (or to validly detach the consequents from their respective material conditional counterparts):
(i) L is true ú¾ L is false (L is true É L is false) (L É ~L)
(ii) L is false ú¾ L is true (L is false É L is true) (~L É L)
Why, we must ask, do these inferences not go through? Given the apparent content of sentence L as denying its
own truth, why does the falsehood of sentence L not validly deductively follow from its truth, or its truth from its
falsehood, as the colloquial description of the liar paradox proposes?
It may be worthwhile at this juncture to take notice of some of the standard and nonstandard reactions to the
content of the liar sentence in allegedly giving rise to the liar paradox independently of concern with the liar
semantic metaparadox. Some logicians have concluded that both the liar sentence L and its negation ~L are
meaningless, and hence neither true nor false. This maneuver forestalls the valid inferences or true material
conditionals in (i) and (ii) standardly needed to derive the liar paradox from the constructability of the liar
sentence. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus dismisses the liar sentence as meaningless
because of the picture theory of meaning, on the grounds that no meaningful sentence can 'get outside itself' or
include within itself a picture of itself with the same logical form or mathematical multiplicity of one-one
corresponding elements under analysis, as any construction per impossibile must do in order to picture an
existent or nonexistent fact about itself.8 Tarski in "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" as we have
mentioned argues that the liar paradox motivates an indefinitely ascending hierarchy of object-languages and
metalanguages to implement the formation principle by which no meaningful sentence in a formalized language
can express the truth or falsehood of other sentences belonging to the same language.9 More recently,
paraconsistent logics that in different ways tolerate syntactical contradictions allow the liar sentence and its
negation to be regarded as both true and false. This strategy accommodates the intuitive sense by which the liar
paradox is supposed to follow from the content of the liar sentence in the orthodox informal characterization.
Graham Priest, for example, in Beyond the Limits of Thought (without reference to the liar in this immediate
context), maintains that: "...if a is both true and false, so is Ø a, and so is a Ù  Ø a. Hence, a contradiction can
be true (if false as well)."10
I do not strongly feel the need to refute any of these resolutions, each of which in my opinion has some merits
and some disadvantages. But I shall briefly remark some of the difficulties I find in each. The sustained criticism
Wittgenstein offers of the picture theory of meaning in the first third of his Philosophical Investigations
constitutes good grounds for preferring an alternative semantics.11 I pass without further comment on the most
trenchant criticisms frequently raised against Tarski's theory of truth. These are that by refusing to permit any
truth predications to be made of sentences within the same language Tarski throws out the baby with the
bathwater, and that the indefinite hierarchy of object-and metalanguages for truth value predications never
achieves a final characterization of the concept of truth. Tarski's metalinguistic restrictions on truth predications
not only disallow diagonal constructions like the liar sentence, to the relief of those who are concerned about its
constructibility entailing semantic paradox, but also all logically perfectly harmless truth value pronouncements,
such as "This sentence is true". The indefinitely ascending stratification of metalanguages in which the truth or
falsehood of sentences in lower tiers of the hierarchy can be made never reaches an endpoint at which the
theorist can say that truth has finally been defined. The Tarskian semantic hierarchy furthermore is self-
consciously ad hoc, supported by no independent justification other than its apparent usefulness in solving the liar
paradox.12 Kripke's solution mentioned earlier, involving truth value gaps in truth predications infinitely iterated
within each tier of a Tarskian metalanguage structure seems unnecessarily complicated. The paraconsistent
analysis of the liar, despite the appeal of its frank avowal of the liar sentence as dialethically both true and false,
strikes me as bizarre. If the liar sentence is both true and false, then the liar dilemma inference to the liar paradox
would appear to be both valid and invalid.13
As an alternative to these received resolutions of the liar, I now want to extend the liar metaparadox I have
already explained to provide semantic considerations that eliminate the paradox altogether in a new and
distinctively deflationary way. The liar sentence L in the account I favor is itself a disguised contradiction. It
therefore standardly validly supports the derivation of any other contradiction, as we see in the first horn of the
liar paradox dilemma, necessitating the trivial valid deduction or default logical truth of the inference or
counterpart material conditional in (i) that takes us from L to S & ~S (and in particular from L to ~L). This is an
interesting result only in revealing the contradiction concealed within L, in somewhat the manner of the Moore
pragmatic paradox sentence, "It is raining, but I don't believe it".14 Yet the liar paradox can be seen to fail in the
second dilemma horn. For, standardly, if the liar sentence L is judged to be a disguised contradiction that validly
implies any other contradiction, then the negation of the liar sentence ~L must be a disguised tautology. I shall
first try to justify these interpretations of L and ~L, paying special attention to the intuitive rationale for regarding
~L as tautologous. Then I shall explain how this interpretation of the negation of the liar sentence in ~L blocks
the standard valid inference from ~L to S & ~S (and in particular from ~L to L) in the second liar paradox
dilemma horn. By the same analogy I conclude that the negation of the liar sentence is logically no more
problematic and in many ways comparable to the pragmatic tautologous redundancy of the negation of the
Moore sentence, "Either it is not raining, or I believe that it is".
The negation of the liar sentence, "It is false that this sentence is false", is standardly logically equivalent to the
affirmation, "This sentence is true". It is clear that the content of the liar sentence in denying its own truth is self-
contradictory, for what the sentence says about itself implies that it is true if and only if it is false.15 This should
entail that the negation of the contradictory liar sentence is a tautology. But in what further intuitive sense is the
negation of the liar sentence, "This sentence is true", tautologous? Standardly, the negation of the liar like any
other sentence is either true or false. But the negation of the liar sentence on pain of contradiction cannot be false,
because then it is logically equivalent to the liar sentence itself, "It is false that this sentence is true" or "This
sentence is false", which by the above standardly implies an outright logical contradiction. Hence, the negation of
the liar sentence must be true. This is to say that the negation of the liar sentence is a disguised tautology in the
same sense and ultimately for the same reason that the liar sentence is a disguised contradiction. That there can
be such disguised contradictions and tautologies in natural language should not astonish anyone. To interpret the
negation of the liar sentence in "It is false that this sentence is false" or "This sentence is true" as a tautology
moreover engenders no further paradox, beyond surprising the uninitiated with the conclusion that a sentence that
asserts its own truth in a kind of limiting case is necessarily trivially vacuously true.16
Although L as a disguised contradiction standardly validly implies S & ~S, ~L as a disguised tautology
standardly implies only other tautologies, and therefore no contradictions. The liar paradox is blocked in this way
at the second paradox dilemma horn. There is thus a confusion in the orthodox informal characterization of how
the liar paradox is supposed to follow from the constructibility of the liar sentence. The semantic analysis of the
content of the liar and its negation which has been sketched reveals the fallacy in the inference. The first part of
the dilemma relying on inference or material conditional (i) above goes through well enough ((i) is valid or true). If
the liar sentence is true, then it is false. If, on the contrary, the liar sentence is false, then the liar sentence itself is
not true; rather, what follows logically is the literal negation of the liar sentence, which simply states, 'This
sentence is true'. This sentence, the negation of the liar, is a tautology, and therefore (necessarily) true. But the
assumption in the second liar paradox dilemma horn that the liar sentence is false in applying the inference or
material conditional in (ii) does not make the liar sentence itself true ((ii) is invalid or false). There is manifestly
nothing paradoxical to be validly derived from the necessary truth of the disguised tautology in the negation of the
liar sentence, 'It is false that this sentence is false' or 'This sentence is true'. The liar dilemma is avoided by
grasping the second horn, which produces only the potentially unexpected result that a sentence asserting its own
truth is a tautology, and does not imply any logical antinomy by itself or in conjunction with the contradiction or
necessary falsehood of the liar sentence.17
I conclude that all the fuss made about the liar sentence and liar paradox is logically gratuitous. The liar sentence
is not validly deducible in any otherwise sound application of language. If we want to avoid what we may
perceive as a contradiction in the liar, despite the metaparadox conclusion that no such contradiction is validly
entailed by the mere constructibility of the liar, then we should take pains not to utter it. Should philosophical
semantics adopt a special policy to prevent us from lying? I do not think so, no more than semantics should
legislate against the constructibility of just plain false sentences, or even more explicitly less controversially
outright contradictory sentences such as S & ~S, or, say, the Moore sentence. There is a family of what might be
called semantically degenerate constructions in languages, which include at one end of the spectrum explicit
contradictions like S & ~S, with the liar and the Moore sentence somewhere toward the other extreme. If we
are interested in clarity of thought and language, and if we are interested in truth, then we should avoid using
these sentences. Similarly, if we are interested in making significant assertions, then we should avoid using
disguised tautologies, like the negation of the liar sentence or pragmatically the negation of the Moore sentence.
But the mere fact that a given language is rich enough to permit the construction of these oddities does not seem
to me to be a good enough reason to prohibit them or to impose any special semantic restrictions on their
formulation or interpretation.
The use of largely informal and dispensably quasi-formal logic in this analysis of the liar sentence shows the extent
to which complicated formal symbolic notations and semantic relations can be avoided in the treatment of some
of the most difficult problems in logic. The paradox disappears when we subject it to a thorough-going critical
analysis using only the most modest and informal logical apparatus. To the extent that this is possible with other
logical problems, the pragmatic principle I have proposed recommends that informal rather than formal logical
methods be employed. That this is not always the most expedient use of logic is indicated by the second example
I shall introduce. Here with respect to a notorious argument in philosophical theology it turns out to be more
advantageous to use formal symbolic logic to discover a hidden logical fallacy in St. Anselm's ontological proof
for the existence of God.
 
Anselm's Ontological Proof
Anselm's ontological proof for the existence of God has a precise modal structure. By formalizing the argument, it
is possible to identify the intensional modal fallacy it contains. The deductive invalidity of Anselm's inference
embodied in the fallacy defeats his argument, even if, contrary to Kant's famous objection, existence is included
as a 'predicate' or identity-determining constitutive property of particulars.
Norman Malcolm in "Anselm's Ontological Arguments" distinguishes two forms of Anselm's inference.18
Malcolm acknowledges that "There is no evidence that [Anselm] thought of himself as offering two different
proofs."19 Some commentators have indeed understood what Malcolm refers to as the second ontological proof
as Anselm's official or final formulation, interpreting the first version as a preliminary attempt to express or
preparatory remarks for the demonstration's later restatement.20 Anselm presents the so-called second
ontological proof in the Proslogion III:
For there can be thought to exist something whose non-existence is inconceivable; and this thing is
greater than anything whose non-existence is conceivable. Therefore, if that than which a greater
cannot be thought could be thought to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would
not be that than which a greater cannot be thought-a contradiction. Hence, something than which a
greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. And You are
this being, O Lord our God. Therefore, Lord my God, You exist so truly that You cannot even be
thought not to exist.21
This passage contains what I regard as the heart of Anselm's proof. For present purposes, I want to avoid the
controversy of whether the text offers one or two distinct arguments. I shall therefore concentrate on this
formulation of Anselm's argument, without trying to decide whether it is essentially the same as or relevantly
different than related inferences about God's existence appearing elsewhere in Anselm's writings. I shall also
follow Charles Hartshorne's recommendation in The Logic of Perfection by referring to the second statement of
Anselm's ontological argument as a kind of modal proof, and of the 'irreducibly modal structure' of this form of
Anselm's argument.22 Yet I differ sharply from Hartshorne in interpreting the modality of Anselm's proof as
intensional rather than alethic.
Where q abbreviates ($x)Px, that a perfect being or perfection exists, Hartshorne attributes this form to
Anselm's proof:
 
Hartshorne's Formalization of Anselm's Alethic Modal Proof for the Existence of God
1. q ® ž q Anselm's principle
2. ž q Ú  ~ ž q Excluded middle
3. ~ ž q ® ž ~ ž q Becker's postulate
4. ž q Ú  ž ~ ž q (3 logical equivalence)
5. ž ~ ž q ® ž ~ q (1 modal form of modus tollens)
6. ž q Ú  ž ~ q (4,5 dilemma and detachment)
7. ~ ž ~ q Perfection not logically impossible
8. ž q (6,7 disjunctive dilemma)
9. ž q ® q Modal axiom
10. q (8,9 detachment)
 
 
This is an elegant but defective derivation. Hartshorne presents Becker's Postulate in proposition (3) as though it
were a universal modal truth. But the principle holds at most only in modal systems like S5 with latitudinarian
semantic transworld-accessibility relations.23 There is furthermore a logical difficulty in a key assumption of the
proof that renders the entire inference unsound.24
Proposition (5), which Hartshorne says follows from (1) as a modal form of modus tollens, is clearly false.
Hartshorne glosses the assumption by maintaining that: "...the necessary falsity of the consequent [of (1)] implies
that of the antecedent...".25 The principle Hartshorne applies to proposition (1) to obtain (5) is thus: (a ® b)®
(ž ~ b ® ž ~ a). This conditional is not generally true, as an obvious counterexample shows. Let a = Snow is
red, and b  = 2+2 = 5. Then the instantiation of a ® b  in Snow is red ® 2+2 = 5 is true by default, if the ®
conditional is interpreted classically, since it is false that snow is red. But it is false that ž ~ b ® ž ~ a in the
instantiation ž ~ (2+2 = 5) ® ž ~ (Snow is red), because although it is true that ž ~(2+2 = 5), it is false that ž ~
(Snow is red). If Hartshorne tries to avoid the counterexample by interpreting the conditional ® nonstandardly in
a relevance logic, then the proof is either deprived of excluded middle in proposition (2), or logically disabled in
its crucial inference from the disjunction in (2) to the conditional in (3).26
 
The problem is magnified in Hartshorne's application of this 'modal form of modus tollens' to proposition q in
proof step (5). Consider that if it is necessary that it is not necessary that snow is white, it by no means follows
that it is necessary (particularly because a fortiori it is not actually the case) that snow is not white. This refutes
the general truth of (5) along with the general principle on which it is supposed to depend. What about
proposition (5), in Hartshorne's specific interpretation, according to which q means ($x)Px, that a perfect being
or perfection exists? After all, proposition (1) is also not generally true, but at most, Hartshorne believes, when q
abbreviates ($x)Px. Here is a dilemma. By Hartshorne's appeal to excluded middle, either proposition q or its
negation is true, q Ú  ~q. If ~q, then Anselm's ontological argument is logically unsound on any interpretation. If
q, then, given Hartshorne's other assumptions in his formalization, the following inference holds:
 
Classical Logical Triviality of Hartshorne's Modal Principle (5)
1. q Assumption
2. q ® ž q Anselm's principle (Hartshorne)
3. ž q ® à ž q Modal axiom (a ® à a)
4. à ž q ® ~ ž ~ ž q Modal duality (à a « ~ ž ~ a)
5. q ® ~ ž ~ ž q (1-4 hypothetical syllogism)
6. ~ ž ~ ž q (1,5 detachment)
 
If q is true, as Hartshorne's conclusion (10) states, that a perfect being or that perfection exists, then Hartshorne's
proposition (5) is logically trivial. For then the antecedent of (5) is false, making ž ~ ž q ® ž ~ q an empty truism
on the classical interpretation of the conditional ®. This makes it equally (classically) uninterestingly true both
that ž ~ ž q ® ~ ž ~ q and ž ~ ž q ® ž q.But since Hartshorne's formalization relies on proposition (5) in its
derivation of (6) from (4) and (3), it follows that the conclusion of Anselm's proof that God exists is true only if
Anselm's proof for the conclusion as Hartshorne interprets it is (classically) logically trivial.
If Hartshorne has correctly represented Anselm's modal ontological argument, then the proof is clearly in bad
shape. Hartshorne's reconstruction makes no use and takes no notice of Anselm's idea about the conceivability
of God as a being than which none greater can be conceived, nor does Hartshorne construe Anselm's proof as
the reductio ad absurdum Anselm intends when he argues as above: "...if that than which a greater cannot be
thought could be thought to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which
a greater cannot be thought-a contradiction".27 The principle of charity therefore requires an effort to locate an
alternative formalization of Anselm's modal argument that avoids Hartshorne's commitment to the manifestly
unsound principle in proposition (5).
I now want to apply some of the symbolizations Priest recommends in formalizing the argument from Anselm's
discussion of God's inconceivability to Anselm's ontological proof for God's existence. Like Priest, I use an
indifferently definite or indefinite description operator d, and I adopt an informal ontically neutral interpretation of
the quantifiers, expressing existence by means of a predicate, E! (E-shriek). I also follow Priest in symbolizing
Anselm's relation of "being greater than" by the convenient predicate '>'. However, I revise Priest's conceivability
operator to extend its scope. I allow the t-operator to range over a greater than relation to express the
conceivability that the relation holds between two objects, instead of merely attaching to an individual object term
as a way of expressing the corresponding object's conceivability. Then I can logically represent Anselm's
definition of God as that than which none greater is conceivable by the expression t(y > x) in g = d x Ø $y t (y
> x).28
By contrast with Hartshorne, I will not emphasize the proof's alethic modality, in the proposition that if a perfect
being exists then it necessarily exists. Instead, I wish to call attention to the proof's hitherto neglected intensional
modality implied by Anselm's reliance on the concept of God as a being than which none greater is conceivable.
This formalization more accurately reflects Anselm's thinking in the ontological proof, which I take to be an
improvement over Hartshorne's. I shall nevertheless argue that the intensional modality implied by wide-scope
conceivability in Anselm's definition of God renders the ontological argument deductively invalid. For as such it
requires a violation salva non veritate of the extensionality of Priest's definite or indefinite description operator.
Then, even if Kant's objection that existence is not a 'predicate' or identity-determining constitutive property is
overturned, the logical structure of Anselm's argument on the most charitable reconstruction nevertheless fails by
virtue of instantiating an intensional modal fallacy.
The ontological proof is formalized by the following inference, in which two new principles are adduced. The first
thesis maintains the extensionality of d, stating that anything identical to a definitely or indefinitely described
object has whatever properties are attributed to the object by the description. The second is a conceivable
greatness thesis, which states that there is always an existent or nonexistent object which is conceivably (if not
also actually) greater in Anselm's sense than any nonexistent object. Anselm's argument can now be symbolized
in this way:
Anselm's Intensional Modal Proof for the Existence of God
1. g = d x Ø $y t (y > x) Definition g
2. "x ( d y ...y... = x ® ...x...) Extensionality d
3. "x ( Ø E! x ® $y t (y > x)) Conceivable greatness
4. Ø E!g Hypothesis for reductio
5. Ø E!g ® $y t (y > g) (3 instantiation)
6. $y t (y > g) (4,5 detachment)
7. Ø $y t (y > g) (1,2 instantiation)
8. E!g (4,6,7 reductio ad absurdum)
 
As in Hartshorne's formalization, Anselm is interpreted as drawing inferences from propositons containing modal
contexts. But here, as opposed to Hartshorne's rendition, the modal contexts in question are intensional rather
than alethic, expressing the intentionality of wide-scope conceivability in the interpolated conceivable greatness
principle.
The proof has several advantages over previous attempts to symbolize Anselm's ontological argument. The
argument as reconstructed is extremely compact, reflecting about the same level of complexity as Anselm's
original prose statement. Anselm's definition of God as that than which none greater is conceivable is explicit in
proposition (1). The punctum saliens of Anselm's proof, that if God does not exist, then there is after all
something conceivably greater than God, is featured prominently in proposition (5), derived via instantiation from
the more general conceivable greatness thesis in (3). Finally, unlike Hartshorne's version, the proposed
formalization explicitly represents Anselm's proof as a reductio. To define God as that than which none greater is
conceivable, and to suppose that God does not exist, is to be embroiled in outright logical contradiction, if, as
Anselm seems to assume, we can always conceive of something greater than anything that does not actually exist.
The proposed method of formalizing Anselm's argument makes it easy to discover the proof's logical weakness.
The problem arises in proposition (7). The conceivability context t é____ù is modal, because it represents an
intensional mode of whatever sentence or proposition is inserted. The context's intensionality is seen in the fact
that coreferential singular denoting terms and logically equivalent propositions cannot be freely intersubstituted in
the context salve veritate. Thus, whereas virtually any short and sweet tautology is conceivable, not every
infinitely long or monstrously complicated tautology logically equivalent to it is also thereby conceivable.
The intensionality of conceivability invalidates the inference from (1) and (2) to (7), by requiring the substitution
of g in definition (1) for the definitely or indefinitely description-bound variable x by the extensionality of d in
principle (2). The standard Kantian objection to Anselm's proof can also be pinpointed in this symbolization to
the conceivable greatness thesis in proposition (3). Kant refutes the ontological argument in the section on 'The
Ideal of Pure Reason' in the Critique of Pure Reason A599/B627-A600/B628. Kant's claim that existence has
no part in the identity-determining constitutive properties of 100 real or unreal gold Thalers challenges the
principle in (3) that we can always conceive of something greater than any nonexistent object. Anselm's
ontological argument cannot succeed if relative greatness is judged only by a comparison of the constitutive
properties that make two or more objects the particular objects they are, to the exclusion of all extraconstitutive
properties that categorize such objects' ontic status as existent or nonexistent.
Kant is certainly right to draw this conditional conclusion. The important question is whether Kant is entitled to
claim that existence is not a 'predicate' or identity-determining constitutive property. There are intriguing
proposals for avoiding Kant's 100 gold Thalers criticism in the philosophical literature, and for reconciling
ourselves to accepting existence as a 'predicate' in the one special logically unique case of God.29 Without
entering into the merits of these replies to Kant, it is worth remarking that even if Kant's objection to the
assumption in (3) is forestalled, the intensional modal structure of Anselm's argument remains deductively
invalid.30 The intensional fallacy arises in Anselm's proof because of its attempt to apply the description context
extensionality principle in assumption (2) at inference step (7) to the definition of God in assumption (1). Since
Kant's conceptual-metaphysical or grammatical refutation of the ontological argument is controversial, the
deductive logical invalidity entailed by the argument's committing the intensional fallacy may now appear to be the
more fundamental and decisive objection to Anselm's ontological proof. Anselm might avoid venially
transgressing Kant's injunction against treating existence as a 'predicate'. But the intensional fallacy in Anselm's
modal ontological argument for the existence of God is its more deadly cardinal sin. The logical error in Anselm's
proof has been entirely overlooked in the history of purely informal discussions of the inference, and it is only by
formalizing the logical structure of Anselm's argument that it becomes possible to identity its deductive invalidity.
 
4. Conclusion
The examples I have considered are not intended as the only or even as the most useful applications of the
pragmatic principle I have endorsed for a partnership between formal and informal logic. They are meant to be
illustrative only in an area where many other solutions or attitudes are possible and might even be preferable. The
general point is partly to voice a plea for tolerance in logical investigations, to recognize and take full advantage
of the continuum of methods available in logic, any of which might be useful and none of which should be
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Instead of relying on the extensionality of d, the method appeals to what Priest calls the Characterization
Principle. The argument takes the following form:
1. j (dx(jx)) Characterization
2. g = dxØ$yt(y > x) Definition g
3. "x(ØE!® $yt(y > x)) Conceivable greatness
4. ØE!g Hypothesis for reductio
5. ØE!g ® $yt(y > g) (3 instantiation)
6. $yt(y > g) (4,5 detachment)
7. l z[z = Ø$yt(y > z)]dxØ$yt(y > x) (1 instantiation)
8. Ø$yt(y > dxØ$yt(y > x)) (7 l-equivalence)
9. Ø$yt(y > g) (2,8 Substitution of identicals)
10. E!g (4,6,9 reductio ad absurdum)
 
Kant's 100 gold Thalers criticism balks at the attempt in step (3) to give an instantiation of the Characterization
Principle. The problem is that nonexistence like existence for Kant is not a 'predicate', which is to say that
nonexistence is not a constitutive identity-determining property. There is moreover a sense in which this
alternative method of formalizing Anselm's proof falls back into the same problem as symbolizations involving the
extensionality of descriptor d. By itself, Ø$yt(y > x) with its unbound variable is not well-formed, and does not
designate a property or even a relational property term. To obtain a substitution instance of Characterization as in
(8) above, it is necessary to resort as in (7) to instantiation via l-conversion. Yet there is a logical equivalence
between l-abstractions and descriptions, as expressed in this untyped statement intuitively equating a formal
abstraction with the or a definitely or indefinitely described property satisfying certain conditions: (" x)
(ly[...y...]x º dz(" y)(zy º (...y...)x)). Applying l-equivalence to proposition (7) to deduce step (8) thereby
again presupposes the extensionality of d. I was led to consider this version of Anselm's proof in responding to
questions raised by Priest in personal correspondence. 
 
31. A version of one main part of this essay was presented at the Conference on Truth, sponsored by the Inter-
University Centre of Dubrovnik, Croatia, held in Bled, Slovenia, June 3-8, 1996, under the title, "Truth as a
Regulative Concept of Philosophical Semantics". I am grateful to John Biro and Brian McLaughlin for useful
comments and criticisms. The material on Anselm is extracted from an unpublished manuscript on
"Conceivability, Intensionality, and the Logic of Anselm's Modal Argument for the Existence of God". My
research for this project was generously supported by the Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific
Exchange Between Italy and the United States of America, during my tenure as J. William Fulbright Distinguished
Lecture Chair in Contemporary Philosophy of Language at the University of Venice, Italy. 
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